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Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's Response to Critical Legal Studies

Year: 1990
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper considers pragmatist response to Critical Legal Studies in context of liberal theory as well as conservative originalism. There are three main prongs to CLS challenge to liberal theory. The first encompasses claim that rule of law is not possible in a society espousing a liberal view of individual freedom. The latter implies a of fundamentally incompatible moral and political viewpoints, infecting modes of order as well as conflict. Hence existence of presumptively pure reasoning, autonomous from political and ethical choice, is impossible. Pragmatism's response is to emphasize that this pluralism is reflected in fabric of law by reason of its reflection of fabric of life. Judging is nevertheless possible, if done by close analogy and case-specific decisions, not by arbitrary selection from diverse body of that can be inferred from authoritative materials. This position can only be defended under assumption that law and institutions do not comprehensively define what is just and right – a position that originalists, especially given their near-absolute deference to legislation, have failed to articulate. The second prong involves claim that the doctrines of contemporary liberal states are riddled by contradictions. Every principle is opposed by another, in every factual context. Judges covertly rely on moral and political considerations in deciding upon which of incompatible norms they will base their decisions. Pragmatism concedes that and constitutional authorities contain contradictory moral and political principles. This is precisely why judges should not readily rely on moral and political principles even when drawn from authoritative sources. The primary source of determinacy in law is found not primarily within ethical and moral principles judges may espouse in their decisions, but in settled lines of fact-specific precedent. The third prong attacks notion that law is even capable of constraining exercise of social and political power. Law is an artifact, a human creation; to regard it as an independent force controlling those who have created and sustained it is akin to fetishism or superstition. The essence of this third claim is that, if language has any settled core of meaning, interpretations required to decide cases are inescapably tied to individual moral and political beliefs. The pragmatic position, on other hand, does not require theory to provide a rationale for choice of institutional structure. If choice was a sound one, it most likely was not made by philosophers or even just lawyers. Instead, it was made in uncountable incremental steps by actors in every realm of social life. The choices made may have, to some degree, become embedded in common law by a process of successive approximation, in which strictly legal institutions did not impose a legal rationale on choices. The process must permit a controlling role for nonlegal choices, albeit one in which choices become reflected in sufficiently determinate language to be applied consistently – language that will unavoidably take on a life of its own, but not intolerably so, if kept faithful to concrete circumstances it was designed to address.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1600039216
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Cited by: 2
Related to: 9