Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation
Year: 1994
Type: preprint
Abstract: AbstradNash's [16] "mass action" interpretation of his equilibrium concept does not presume that the players know the game or are capable of sophisticated calculations.Instead, players are repeatedly and ran• domly drawn from large populations to play the game, one population for each player position, and base their strategy choice on observed payoffs.The present paper examines in some detail such an interpretation in a dass of population dynamics based on adaptation by way of imitation of successful behaviors.Drawing from results in evolutionary game theory, implications of dynamic stability for aggregate Nash equilibrium play are discussed.• An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference »Rationality in Economics", held at the ICER, Turin, Italy, October 1993.We are grateful for comrnents from the discussant and from participants in this conference, as weil as from participants in the Roy seminar, Paris, December 1993.
Authors: Jonas Björnerstedt, Jörgen W. Weibull
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1603320759
