Year: 1977
Type: article
Abstract: PROBLEM W 7HEN choosing from many competing alternatives, groups often narrow the range of choice and then select from the remaining alternatives using a predetermined procedure or agenda.'In some groups, this process may involve the use of committee reports and parliamentary procedure.In others, choices may be narrowed by common consent, by the chairman, or by some other means and "voting" may proceed in a predetermined, nonparliamentary fashion.Recent developments in the theory of group choice (embodied in a literature that has come to be known as the "social choice" literature) suggest that there probably is no single nondictatorial method of aggregating the preferences of an electorate that will reliably produce a choice which satisfies minimal consistency and rationality standards.2Since reasonably plausible
Source: Virginia Law Review
DOI: 10.2307/1072445
Authors: Michael E. Levine, Charles R. Plott
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W1607329130