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Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

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Year: 2015
Type: preprint
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2602751
Authors: Gregory S. Crawford, Nicola Pavanini, Fabiano Schivardi
Institutions: University of Zurich, Tilburg University, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli
Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Subfield: Finance
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: Economic and Social Research Council
Award: G3180730516
OpenAlex ID: W1730056563
Cites: 78
Cited by: 60
Related to: 10
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