Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: Pure' representationalism -the theory that explains all mental features in terms of representational (or intentional) content -fails, because it cannot account for the attitudinal component of mental states like beliefs and desires.The attitude+content analysis is the most promising intentionalist account of bodily sensations and certain emotions: an itch is analysed as a bodily part represented under an 'itching' psychological mode.However, there is no general argument for the claim that all sensations and emotions need to have an object: some consist only of a subjective feel, and are not directed at anything beyond themselves.To make this account plausible, we have to give up the idea that qualia are purely contingently related to certain functional roles.Some subjective feelings have a functional role; however, having a functional role does not entail having intentional objects.
Author: Katalin Farkas
Institution: Central European University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W174743217