From evolutionary to strategic stability
Year: 2000
Type: article
Abstract: A component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set. If the Euler characteristic would be zero, the dynamics (which justifies potential stability) could be slightly perturbed so as to remove all zeros close to the component. Hence, any robustly potentially stable component contains equilibria which satisfy the strongest rationalistic refinement criteria.
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
Authors: Stefano Demichelis, Klaus Ritzberger
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1757724340