Work

Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures

Year: 2012

Type: article

Abstract: We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts. (JEL D72, H70)

Source: American Economic Journal Economic Policy

DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.3.1

Authors: Toke S Aidt, Julia Shvets

Institution: University of Cambridge

Language: English

Topic: Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1759944947

FWCI: 12.88

Cites: 49

Cited by: 57

Related to: 10