Work

Assertion and belief without knowledge

Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: Recent epistemology has been dominated by the knowledge first approach \nchampioned by Timothy Williamson and others, and its influence continues to grow, \nspreading into the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and beyond. \nProponents of the knowledge first approach have argued for the centrality and \nimportance of knowledge in these areas of philosophy by arguing that there is \nsomething wrong with asserting or believing something that one doesn’t know, that \nassertion and belief are to be understood in terms of knowledge, and that a \nknowledge‐maximizing principle of charity is constitutive of the contents of one’s \nassertions and beliefs. I attack the knowledge first approach by developing more \nplausible accounts of assertion, belief, and the determination of content that break \nthese supposed ties with knowledge.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1777668935
FWCI:
Cites: 106
Cited by: 15
Related to: 10