Year: 2012
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Large system installations are increasingly configured using high-level, mostly-declarative languages. Often, different users contribute data that is compiled centrally and distributed to individual systems. Although the systems themselves have been developed with reliability and availability in mind, the configuration compilation process can lead to unforeseen vulnerabilities because of the lack of access control on the different components combined to build the final configuration. Even if simple change-based access controls are applied to validate changes to the final version, changes can be lost or incorrectly attributed. Based on the growing literature on provenance for database queries and other models of computation, we identify a potential application area for provenance to securing configuration languages. 1
Authors: Paul Anderson, James Cheney
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Topic: Access Control and Trust
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1803022238