"Maladaptive" Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives
Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: The federal government has been slow to confront problems such as climate change, but many states have adopted innovative approaches to addressing the impacts of using natural resources to produce energy, including aggressive regulation of carbon emissions and renewable energy standards.This Article questions whether celebration of these types of state initiatives as a form of "adaptive" federalism is premature.The Article identifies an emerging challenge that subnational regulation faces in the energy and environmental context-what I will call "maladaptive" federalism-and argues that federalism discussions need to account for its possibility.Part I highlights adaptive regulation as a form of federalism, echoing a vision for subnational regulation that many federalism scholars and policymakers have endorsed over the past two decades.Part II argues that policy choices by subnational units of government that fail to account for or consider these coordination benefits should not be celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism merely because they are state policy choices.I identify subnational recalcitrance (on inaction by states) and backlash (or reversing course) as two potential types of maladaptation, provide examples of each, and use these to illustrate the structural features of subnational governments that make maladaptation most likely.Part III evaluates the pro-adaptation tools that federal agencies can use to address the enactment costs of states taking maladaptive approaches.In certain contexts, such as in clean energy initiatives, focusing on enactment costs associated with the structure of state governments will be superior to federal policies that preempt subnational units of government altogether by making the policy choice for them.Such tools not only make maladaptation less likely; they also help to ensure that when a state does opt for a maladaptive policy path that it does so because it is making explicit tradeoffs in †
Source: Case Western Reserve law review
Author: Jim Rossi
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1807506581
