Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman
Year: 1998
Type: article
Abstract: We are grateful to Richard Posner and Mark Kelman for their detailed comments on our article. Their objections come from opposite directions. Judge Posner complains that behavioral economics is not a "theory" and is in- deed "antitheoretical"'; he invokes "evolutionary considerations" in the interest of providing a unitary account of both rational and "quasi rational" behavior, as well as bounded self-interest. Posner also thinks that rational choice theory can handle many of the problems we describe. By contrast, Professor Kelman wishes that we were less theoretical. Favoring "open- textured interpretivism," he thinks that behavioral economics is in a kind of "dance" with rational choice theory, and that both dancers suffer from "hubris." He suggests that both approaches are mere "interpretive tropes," providing two of many possible understandings of the "inexorably ambiguous" data.
Source: Stanford Law Review
DOI: 10.2307/1229307
Institution: Yale University
Language: English
Subfield: General Decision Sciences
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1840723930