Year: 2017
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this Article, Professors Kahan and Rock document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. The authors argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than incidental and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in the incentive structures of hedge fund managers as well as in the fact that traditional institutions face regulatory barriers, political constraints, or conflicts of interest that make activism less profitable than it is for hedge funds. But the differences may also be due to the fact that traditional institutions pursue a diversification strategy that is difficult to combine with strategic activism.
Source: Gower eBooks
Parent work: Corporate Governance: Values, Ethics and Leadership
Authors: Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Institution: New York University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
Funder: University of Pennsylvania
OpenAlex ID: W1850218143