Seeing Other People
Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: Seeing Other PeopleWe get to know things in a number of different ways.For instance, among the things that I know are the following: that 4 2 = 16; that the grass in my garden is green; that it rained last night; that the rosebush in the garden is an Indian Summer; that right now my baby daughter is miserable.The ways in which I might have come to know each of these things is a matter contested, but most would agree that naïve consciousness characterises the first four in something like the following way: I know that 4 2 = 16 by reason alone; I know that the grass in my garden is green because I am currently enjoying a conscious experience of it; I know that it rained last night because, although I was asleep at the time, I can see that it is wet and infer that this must have been caused by rain; I know that the rosebush in the garden is an Indian Summer because my neighbour told me, and she is something of an expert on roses.In short, knowledge can be apriori, perceptual, inferential, and testimonial.What about my knowledge that right now my baby daughter is miserable?How do I know that?Can it be assimilated to one of these four ways of gaining knowledge, or do we need a fifth category?We can straight away put aside both the apriori and knowledge by testimony.Central to my knowledge is surely a visual experience of my daughter in which no-one speaks or otherwise lets me know how she feels.So my knowledge is not apriori, nor is it based on testimony. 1This leaves us with perception, inference and our, as yet unspecified, fifth option.The fifth option is, of course, the criterial view. 2 My purpose in what follows is not to adjudicate between these three.1 Some knowledge of others' mentality is testimonial.Indeed, arguably one of the simplest ways of finding out how it is with another is by asking and being told.The point, however, is that not all knowledge of others is gotten in this way.Nor could it be.Perhaps even some knowledge of how it is with another (right now) is apriori.I will, however, limit myself to items of knowledge of others the canonical justification of which depends essentially on experience. 2
Author: JOEL SMITH
Institution: University of Manchester
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1851448097