South Africa's voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in terms of international law
Year: 2011
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The subject of this research is “South Africa’s Voluntary Relinquishment of \nits Nuclear Arsenal and Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of \nNuclear Weapons in Terms of International Law”. The research found that \ninternational law considerations did indeed play an important role in \nguiding South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal, and in \naccession to the NPT. \nThe dissertation was conducted by interviewing an expert sample of the \nkey persons who were actually involved with, and led, South Africa’s \nrelinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the \nNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The decision to interview the \nexpert respondents was followed in order to understand the respondents’ \nanimus or state of mind, and the logos of the decision to relinquish the \nnuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. \nThe study sample included: \n• Mr FW de Klerk, former President of South Africa, who instructed \nthat the nuclear arsenal should be relinquished, and that South \nAfrica should accede to the NPT; \n• Professor Wynand Mouton, whom Mr de Klerk appointed as the \nOversight Auditor of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and its \naccession to the NPT; \n• Professor Waldo Stumpf, who successfully project-managed the \nnuclear relinquishment process, and brought accession to the NPT \ninto reality; \n• Mr Pik Botha, who was South Africa’s longest-serving Minister of \nForeign Affairs, and who later held the portfolio of Minister of \nEnergy. Mr Botha was personally involved in leading many \nimportant international negotiations that pertained to South Africa’s \nnuclear status over some decades; and \n• Dr Neil Barnard, who was Director of South Africa’s National \nIntelligence Service at the time. \nAn important and new research finding was that all of the respondents \nindicated that the reason the nuclear weapons were relinquished and \nSouth Africa acceded to the NPT was that the relinquishment of these \nweapons and the accession to the NPT were symbiotically interconnected \nwith the constitutional settlement in South Africa. For the respondents, it \nwas a causa sine qua non of the international acceptance and recognition \nof South Africa’s non-racial constitutional settlement. The respondents \nwere ad idem that it would have been well-nigh impossible to have \nachieved a peaceful constitutional settlement which was internationally \n5 \nlegitimate without relinquishing these weapons and acceding to the NPT \nprior to the conclusion of the constitutional negotiations. \nHad South Africa held onto this nuclear arsenal, it would have created \ninternational mistrust, because it would have begged the question (petitio \nprincipii): “What is the purpose of their retention?” The perpetuation of the \nnuclear weapons programme would have created international doubt as to \nthe sincerity of the constitutional transition and contributed to the \ncontinued recognition of South Africa as a pariah state. \nThis finding has not been reported in the literature and is therefore a new \ncontribution to knowledge about South Africa’s constitutional transition. \nAlthough not publicly visible, the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and \nSouth Africa’s accession to the NPT were purposively linked, and indeed \nsynchronised, with the constantly changing status of the constitutional \nnegotiations – ratione temporis. \nThe link between the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and the \naccession to the NPT was purposefully kept secret. This was because it \nwas reasoned that the matter of South Africa’s design of a nuclear \narsenal, its possession of these weapons, its dismantlement of these \nweapons, and its accession to the NPT formed such a potentially \ncontentious matter, both nationally and internationally, that it could easily \nhave thrust the entire constitutional transition into jeopardy. For this \nreason it was decided (wisely, in the researcher’s view) to address the \nmatter of relinquishment and accession to the NPT in camera. It was \nconducted in camera because the security of the state was at stake. The \ntestimony of the respondents made it clear that this subject was \nsufficiently incendiary to have derailed the constitutional negotiations and \nsettlement, and plunged the country into chaos. \nThe research discovered that the reason the decision was reached to \nrelinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT was to ensure that \nSouth Africa was recognised as a constitutional democracy and a \nrespected member of the international community of nations. The mission \nwas conducted in order to achieve state succession in a stable framework \nof constitutional continuity. \nThe research also discovered that a number of the countries that have \nrelinquished their nuclear weapons and acceded to the Treaty on the Non- \nProliferation of Nuclear Weapons did so because of the imperative to \ncreate a positive state recognition status amongst the international \ncommunity. Had South Africa retained the nuclear arsenal during the \nconstitutional negotiations, and afterwards, it would have tainted and \njeopardised the state succession and the constitutional continuity of the \ncountry. It would have endowed the government-in-waiting with a \npoisoned chalice and undermined Mr Mandela’s stature as a leader. The \ndecision was made by Mr de Klerk and conducted in good faith insofar as \nall stakeholders were concerned. \n \nComity was displayed by the National Party towards the African National \nCongress – the regime-in-waiting – in order to endow it with the \nopportunity of becoming a successful government. The research found \nthat Mr de Klerk, together with his team, carefully reconciled and \nharmonised South African municipal law with international law in order to \nobviate a conflict of laws. This harmonisation of law was important in \nestablishing respectful relationships and comity with the International \nAtomic Energy Agency, which is an organ imbued with international legal \npersonality under the United Nations Charter, and with the international \ninspectors, including those from inter alia the United States, Russia, the \nUnited Kingdom, China and France. \nThe expert respondents were all in consensus that South Africa could \nnever have lawfully deployed the nuclear weapons in any conceivable \nmilitary conflict, including in the case where the very existence of the \nSouth African State might have been at risk. They unanimously expressed \nthe opinion that such usage would have constituted a mala in se and been \ncontrary to natural law and peremptory norms of humanity. The principles \nof jus cogens and erga omnes permeated their assessment of the legality \nof any usage of nuclear weapons. \nThe respondents were also in agreement that any actual use of these \nweapons would be disproportionate, indiscriminate, escalatory, and would \nnot be able to discern friend from foe, and therefore would be contrary to \ninternational humanitarian law. The usage of a nuclear bomb would have \nbeen a threat to world peace in terms of the United Nations Charter, which \nmight have justified a United Nations-sanctioned military invasion of South \nAfrica to counteract such a threat to world peace, as was the case when \nIraq invaded Kuwait. \nThe interviewees were in consensus that if the nuclear weapons had been \ndeployed, they would have escalated conflict, and created an international \nreprisal risk with potentially disastrous consequences for South Africa, the \nregion, and indeed for the world at large. The research sample further \nindicated that any operational use of these nuclear weapons would have \ncreated disproportional consequences, which would, by deduction, have \ncontravened inter alia: the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations \nConventions, the Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928), the Martens Clause, and \ntherefore international humanitarian law. \nIt would have raised the question of state responsibility for wrongful \nactions, which would also have included contraventions of international \nenvironmental law caused by trans-boundary nuclear pollution. Individuals \ncommitting wrongful actions could not have pleaded immunity from such \nwrongfulness by claiming immunity under South African municipal law. \nThe respondents subscribed to a positive law interpretation of the legality \nof nuclear deterrence, which is the position that the Nuclear Weapons \nStates have assumed. In its essence, this positive law view subscribes to \nthe principle contained in the Lotus case, that what is not prohibited ispermitted. Natural law and positive law have oppositional reasoning as \nregards the legality of nuclear weapons, and this logical tension was \nevident in the research. The respondents revealed a difference of opinion \nas far as their understanding of the legality of the development, \npossession, testing and deterrence versus actual usage of nuclear \nweapons is concerned. They were of the view that any military usage or \nnuclear test would be illegal, but regarded the development, possession \nand deterrent usage of nuclear weapons as being lawful. \nThe relinquishment process and accession to the NPT was conducted as \na secret set of negotiations contiguous with the constitutional negotiations. \nIt is a fact that the African National Congress was not informed about
Author: Geoffrey Ronald Heald
Institution: University of the Witwatersrand
Language: English
Topic: Nuclear Issues and Defense
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: U.S. Department of Energy
OpenAlex ID: W187121685
