Work

Field Evidence on Individual Behavior & Performance in Rank-Order Tournaments

Year: 2012

Type: article

Abstract: Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2,775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies non-monotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, while the highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interpret a number of tournament design policies (number of competitors, prize allocation and structure, number of divisions, open entry) and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer.

Source: The RAND Journal of Economics

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12121

Authors: Kevin J. Boudreau, Constance E. Helfat, Karim R. Lakhani, Michael Menietti

Institutions: Northeastern University, National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, London Business School

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,400

Funders: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Harvard Business School