Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority in the Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from a 'Lab in the Field' Experiment in Uganda
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: Social sanctioning is widely considered a viable solution to social dilemmas. Public Goods games have provided experimental evidence in support of the role sanctioning plays in sustaining cooperation even when incentives to free-ride are pervasive. Although in real life centralized systems of control are ubiquitous, experimental research has mostly focused on peer-punishment institutions. To test the effect of centralized punishment, we designed a novel adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to an external monitor. Our lab in the field experiment involved 1,554 farmers from 50 farmer cooperatives through Uganda and is the first study to provide evidence of the effectiveness of a centralized sanctioning institution. Moreover, we also demonstrate the importance of legitimate authority in fostering cooperation: participants are more responsive to the authority of an elected rather than randomly chosen monitor. Finally, we relate players' behavior in the games to their level of cooperation in the farmer organization and show that farmers' performance in the game setting is consistent with their real life outcomes.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1881899373