Procrastination and projects
Year: 2015
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each player is only able to observe their own effort, not the effort of others.\nI characterize the optimal effort path for general distributions of breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination is not a result of irrational behavior and is even present in the welfare-maximizing solution.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Philipp Külpmann
Institution: Bielefeld University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1893822460