Work

The use of armed conflict as a bargaining tool against unsophisticated opponents

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: This paper studies the role of conflict as a bargaining instrument and its impact on dispute termination. We explore an infinite-horizon bargaining game where limited conflicts reveal information about the contenders relative strength. We study the case where the uninformed party learns from battlefield outcomes but does not learn fully from diplomacy. The equilibrium of this bargaining game displays several features observed in real-world disputes. First, convergence in expectations about relative strengths is not suffcient for dispute termination. Second, defeats lead to gambles for resurrection when limited conflicts are not too costly. Finally, disputes display non-monotonic termination probabilities over time.

Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107809

Authors: Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, Anıl Yıldızparlak

Institution: King's College London

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,180