Year: 2009
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels.
Authors: Bin Dong, Uwe Dulleck, Benno Torgler
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W192471198