Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: This work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price programs only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. The budget-constrained auction performs similarly to the target-constrained in the one-shot setting but appears more robust to repetition. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic, and we propose a method for improving such estimates. (JEL Q24)
Source: Land Economics
DOI: 10.3368/le.83.4.497
Authors: S. Schilizzi, U. Latacz-Lohmann
Institution: The University of Western Australia
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
SDG: Life on land
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W1945702602