Year: 2010
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The subjectively experienced 'phenomenality' of consciousness is often taken to constitute the greatest enigma of the contemporary philosophy of mind, or even science in general: how can phenomenal conscious experience arise out of its physical substrate? The so called higher-order theories of consciousness propose to solve this problem by the cognitive ability of being aware of one's own mental states. The first and foremost justification for these theories is the intuitively appealing idea that only those mental states are conscious, which we are somehow aware of. In this study, these theories and the core intuition they rely on are examined. It is claimed that while this intuition holds for everyday human consciousness, it does not hold equally well for the more primitive kinds of consciousness, such as infant or animal consciousness. The intuition also conflicts with the opposite intuition that self-awareness can be detrimental to the vividness of world-directed consciousness. The intuition itself remains unexplained, and the theories lack relevant empirical support. To solve these problems, a novel conception of higher-order consciousness is suggested, a practical form of consciousness characteristic of human beings called 'mentalized consciousness'. It essentially involves self-awareness and develops in the early interaction of an infant and its primary caregivers, as suggested by recent theories and findings in empirical psychology. It is shown that, while avoiding their problems, the intuitive appeal of the higher-order theories of consciousness can be explained by the concept of mentalized consciousness.
Author: Pessi Lyyra
Institution: University of Jyväskylä
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1955182267