Work

Civil institutions and evolution: Concepts, critique and models

Year: 1995

Type: article

Abstract: The paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution. The survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection. The sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties. This paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions. It then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games. It is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one. Since it is the latter that is of interest to economists, an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games.

Source: Journal of Development Economics

DOI: 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00046-f

Author: Kaushik Basu

Institutions: University of Delhi, Cornell University

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,590