Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-Based Theory
Year: 1996
Type: article
Abstract: Consider a duopoly market in which consumers have heterogeneous information about the quality differential q of the two goods. When firms are ignorant about q, consumers rationally believe that a firm with high market shares is likely to produce a high-quality good. As a result, firms try to signal-jam the inferences of consumers and compete for market shares beyond the level explained by short-run profit maximization. When firms know q, multiple equilibria may exist, but there is always one equilibrium in which market shares signal quality, and then the market tends to be more competitive.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI: 10.2307/2555924
Authors: Ramon Caminal, Xavier Vives
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1971178427
