Evaluation Bias and Incentive Structures in Bi‐ and Multilateral Aid Agencies
Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: Evaluation is generally considered as an important tool to ensure the effective use of development aid, but it is itself subject to distortions. To derive institutional conditions conducive to effective evaluation, we develop a multi‐level principal‐agent model focusing on the interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies’ conflicting objectives of transparency and self‐legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Source: Review of Development Economics
Authors: Katharina Michaelowa, Axel Borrmann
Institution: Hamburg Institute of International Economics
Language: English
Subfield: Development
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1980148868