Work

Replicators in a Fine-Grained Environment: Adaptation and Polymorphism

Year: 2009

Type: article

Abstract: Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multiplayer replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms correspond to the time-averaged payoffs, while the three- and four-player terms arise from the adaptation of the morphs to their varying environment. Such multiplayer terms can induce a stable polymorphism. The establishment of the polymorphism in partnership games [genetic selection] is accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population.

Source: Physical Review Letters

DOI: 10.1103/physrevlett.102.058102

Authors: Armen E. Allahverdyan, Chin-Kun Hu

Institutions: A. Alikhanyan National Laboratory, Chung Yuan Christian University, Institute of Physics, Academia Sinica

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1985443298

FWCI: 2.164

Cites: 24

Cited by: 12

Related to: 10