Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: In Germany, competitive franchising is increasingly being used to procure passenger railway services that were previously provided by a state monopolist. This paper analyzes 77 tenders that differ with respect to network size, service frequency, contract duration and the proximity to other lines that are already run by competitors of DB Regio, a subsidiary of the successor of the former state monopolist. Our analysis shows that competitors are more likely to win small networks and more recent auctions. Other controls such as contract duration and the adjacency to other lines run by entrants are insignificant.
Source: Review of Network Economics
Authors: Rafael Lalive, Armin Schmutzler
Institutions: University of Zurich, University of Lausanne
Language: English
Subfield: Transportation
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,712
OpenAlex ID: W1987044518