The Ontology of Consent
Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper, I show that consent is neither a performative nor a mental state plus a signification thereof. Rather, consent is a mental state, that of waiving one’s moral or legal objection to the consented-to act. Signification provides evidence of consent but does not constitute its existence. It can, however, affect the culpability of those who act with or without that evidence. Consent does depend on what information the putative consenter possesses regarding the act in question. The informational requisites of valid consent is a quite difficult and undertheorized topic. The motivational requisites of valid consent, however, is not a difficult matter.
Source: Analytic Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12035
Author: Larry Alexander
Institution: University of San Diego
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1988095300