Work

The Role of Auditor Choice in Debt Pricing in Private Firms*

Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: We examine the role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms. Since both Moody's and Standard & Poor's comprehensively rate 144A bond issues made by private firms, we can isolate the importance of the information and insurance motives for hiring a Big Four auditor. After controlling for other determinants and non-random selection of external auditors, we fail to find that the presence of a Big Four auditor affects the yield spreads or credit ratings on these securities. This implies that auditor choice affects neither the perceptions of credit rating agencies about the credibility of issuers' financial statements nor the perceptions of bondholders about implicit insurance coverage against future losses stemming from audit failure. Consistent with Chaney et al.'s (2004) finding that private firms do not pay more for Big Four audits, our evidence suggests that private firms with Big Four auditors do not benefit from lower borrowing costs.
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1990343846
FWCI: 22.56
Cites: 92
Cited by: 207
Related to: 10