Work

Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development

Year: 2008

Type: article

Abstract: This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality. © Journal compilation © 2008 by the Royal Economic Society.

Source: The Economic Journal

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02173.x

Authors: Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato, Uwe Sunde

Institutions: IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, University of Bologna, United Nations, University of St.Gallen

Language: English

Topic: Culture, Economy, and Development Studies

Subfield: Demography

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1995459039

FWCI: 11.65

Cites: 92

Cited by: 60

Related to: 10