Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes
Year: 1996
Type: article
Abstract: Social costs created by delay in the resolution of legal disputes have motivated an extensive theoretical literature studying the causes of delay. However, much less work has investigated a related, more policy-relevant question: how do legal institutions empirically affect delay in settlement? Based on analysis of the timing of settlement of automobile bodily injury insurance claims. I present two major findeings on this topic. First, delay in trial courts increases delay in settlement Second, state tort laws designed to reduce delay in settlement do not work as intended. Reforms imposing prejudgment interest, which were designed to reduce delay, actually increase delay in settlement, controlling for other state-level institutional factors and the characteristics of claims.
Author: D. Kessler
Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Stanford University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1995635741