Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception
Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and objecthood, and (3) refine the phenomenological target by differentiating between perceptual presence and the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or "phenomenal unreality." It turns out that this requires blue-sky thinking.
Source: Cognitive Neuroscience
Author: Anil K. Seth
Institution: University of Sussex
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1996079551
