Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: Engagement in various forms of peace-building has increased dramatically since the Cold War, yet what is the future of peace-building in the aftermath of the troubled intervention in Afghanistan? This article argues that while many Western and allied governments will feel chastened by the experience in Central Asia, their impulse to ‘do good’ internationally will not altogether disappear. Instead, to avoid manage the complexity of future interventions, intervening government may be tempted to reinvoke the traditional peace-building principles drawn from the 1990s – neutrality, consent-based operations, and the minimum use of force. Such a tendency, this article argues, is based on a flawed historical understanding of the experiences of the 1990s and underestimates what it takes to build peace after war. Dissecting the peace-building principles in light of more recent experiences with counterinsurgency, the article explores the full requirements for effective intervention in war-to-peace transitions. It then concludes by discussing what these requirements mean for those states that express interest in peace-building, but whose commitment and capabilities are often found lacking.
Source: Contemporary Security Policy
Author: David H. Ucko
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W1997197314