Work

The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information

Year: 2013

Type: preprint

Source: SSRN Electronic Journal

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312320

Authors: Damien Besancenot, Delphine Dubart, Radu Vranceanu

Institutions: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Université Panthéon-Assas, École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales, ESSEC Business School, Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications, Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: University of California, San Diego

OpenAlex ID: W2000240956

Cites: 40

Cited by: 29

Related to: 10