Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are ‘stretched’ by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and non‐overboarded outside directors.
Source: Journal of Management Studies
Authors: Ira C. Harris, Katsuhiko Shimizu
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2002118173
