Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger
Year: 1988
Type: article
Abstract: The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input prices and profits are affected by the structures of the upstream and the downstream industries, by the demand relations among the final products, and by the nature of the bargaining between the suppliers and firms. The implications for the incentives for merger turn out to be significantly different from what they would be in an alternative environment where prices are not determined in bargaining.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI: 10.2307/2555664
Authors: Henrick Horn, Asher Wolinsky
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2002955697