Work

2. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Year: 2002

Type: book-chapter

Abstract: We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: How do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.

Source: Princeton University Press eBooks

DOI: 10.1515/9780691220178-003

Authors: Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman

Institutions: Princeton University, National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Centre for Economic Policy Research

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Princeton University, European University Institute