The Principle of the Common Cause Faces the Bernstein Paradox
Year: 1999
Type: article
Abstract: I consider the problem of extending Reichenbach's principle of the common cause to more than two events, vis-à-vis an example posed by Bernstein. It is argued that the only reasonable extension of Reichenbach's principle stands in conflict with a recent proposal due to Horwich. I also discuss prospects of the principle of the common cause in the light of these and other difficulties known in the literature and argue that a more viable version of the principle is the one provided by Penrose and Percival (1962).
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/392749
Author: Jos Uffink
Institution: Utrecht University
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2008411291