Work

Budgetary rules to minimize societal poverty in a general equilibrium context

Year: 1992

Type: article

Abstract: This paper derives budgetary rules for the allocation of an exogenously supplied budget to mutually exclusive socioeconomic groups so that the maximum reduction of poverty for society as a whole is attained. Budgetary rules are derived for two mechanisms of intra-group benefit distribution and for the cases where the effects of economic interaction within and between groups is considered and where it is not. A computer simulation of the budgetary rules on a hypothetical economy demonstrates the importance of economic interaction both to the optimal allocation of benefits and to the resulting reduction in poverty.

Source: Journal of Development Economics

DOI: 10.1016/0304-3878(92)90036-9

Authors: Erik Thorbecke, David Berrian

Institution: Cornell University

Language: English

Topic: Income, Poverty, and Inequality

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: No poverty, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,590