Work

Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation

Year: 2014

Type: article

Abstract: This paper examines the process that drives the formation and evolution of disclosure regulations. In equilibrium, changes in the regulation depend on the status quo, standard-setters’ political accountability and underlying objectives, and the cost and benefits of disclosure to reporting entities. Excessive political accountability need not implement the regulation preferred by diversified investors. Political pressures slow standard-setting and, if the standard-setter prefers high levels of disclosure, induce regulatory cycles characterized by long phases of increasing disclosure requirements followed by a sudden deregulation.

Source: Review of Accounting Studies

DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9312-9

Authors: Jeremy Bertomeu, Robert P. Magee

Institutions: Baruch College, City University of New York, Northwestern University

Language: English

Topic: Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,190