Work

Collusion and Outcome Equivalency

Year: 2008

Type: article

Abstract: This paper considers a principal-agent model with adverse selection, in which collusion among the agents is possible. We compare the optimal outcome in two cases: (i) the principal can perfectly discriminate the transfers to the agents, and (ii) the principals power to discriminate the transfers to the agents is limited. We find that the principals payoff is not affected by limitation on transfer discrimination.

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE

DOI: 10.1628/093245608785363425

Author: Dongsoo Shin

Institution: Santa Clara University

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2012789084

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