Year: 1997
Type: article
Abstract: For centuries it has been a mainstay of European and American moral thought that keeping promises-and the allied activity of upholding contracts-is one of the most important requirements of morality. On some historically powerful views the obligation to uphold promises or contracts not only regulates private relationships, but also provides the moral foundation for our duty to support and obey legitimate governments. Some theorists believe that the concept of keeping promises has gradually moved to center stage in European moral thought. They see this movement as part of an historical shift from a moral conception in which an individual's duties are mainly externally imposed and unalterable, to a conception in which duties are largely chosen by the individual.' In this paper I wish to examine a paradoxical aspect of the practice of promising which suggests that making and keeping promises may not always have the high moral luster usually ascribed to them. I shall argue that a system of moral rules avoids this problem only if it ascribes no moral value at all to the keeping of promises. To see the problem, let us begin by looking at a typical example of promising.
Source: The Philosophical Review
DOI: 10.2307/2998356
Author: Holly M. Smith
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2012802206