Work

Individuals and teams in auctions

Year: 2008

Type: article

Abstract: Experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders, even though teams are often involved in real auctions. We examine the bidding behaviour of individuals and teams. Our experimental results show that teams stay longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction and pay significantly higher prices than individuals. Consequently, teams make smaller profits and suffer more often from the winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since bidders with the highest valuation are more likely to win the auction when teams bid. We relate our findings to the European UMTS-spectrum auctions.

Source: Oxford Economic Papers

DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpn037

Authors: Matthias Sutter, Martin G. Kocher, Sabine Strauß

Institutions: Universität Innsbruck, University of Gothenburg, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2013117190

FWCI: 6.119

Cites: 57

Cited by: 52

Related to: 10