Work

Splitting leagues: promotion and demotion in contribution-based regrouping experiments

Year: 2012

Type: article

Abstract: The paper reports an experimental study on a promotion-demotion mechanism to mitigate the free-rider problem in a voluntary contribution setting. The mechanism hierarchically splits a group in two; we refer to one subgroup as the Major league and to the other as the minor league. The most cooperative subject of the minor league is switched with the least cooperative subject in the Major league. The results reveal a significant increase of cooperation levels in both leagues relative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We argue that a lack of sequentially-rational beliefs about continuation payoffs in Major and minor leagues leads to higher equilibrium contributions. The data suggest beyond that, the promotion-demotion mechanism regroups subjects deliberately according to their cooperativeness.

Source: Experimental Economics

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9346-4

Authors: Susana Cabrera, Enrique Fatás, Juan A. Lacomba, Tibor Neugebauer

Institutions: Universidad de Málaga, University of East Anglia, Universidad de Granada, University of Luxembourg

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: Economic and Social Research Council

Award: G2786489296