The Optimal Licensing Strategy of an Outside Patentee in Vertically-Related Markets
Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: We extend the model in Kamien and Tauman (1986) by considering vertically-related markets where the outside innovator transfers new technology by means of either a royalty or a fixed fee. Our conclusion is different with Kamien and Tauman (1986) and announces that the optimal licensing strategy for an outside innovator is a royalty contract with a non-exclusion licensing case. When the innovation size is small, the outside innovator’s licensing behavior causes low social welfare.
Authors: Ming-Chung Chang, Jin-Li Hu, Chin-Hung Lin
Institutions: Kainan University, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Language: English
Subfield: Management of Technology and Innovation
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Funder: National Science Council
OpenAlex ID: W2021565028
