Work

Career Concerns in Teams

Year: 2002

Type: article

Abstract: We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents’ innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long‐term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their teammates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal offers more collectively oriented incentive schemes. Temporary workers, though, are not affected by the sabotage effect, and their incentives are more individually oriented.

Source: Journal of Labor Economics

DOI: 10.1086/338240

Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol, Guido Friebel, Lambros Pechlivanos

Institutions: Institut d'Économie Industrielle, Centre for Economic Policy Research

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green

Funder: European Commission