Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: In National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller defends the view that a member of a nation can be collectively responsible for an outcome despite the fact that: (i) she did not control it; (ii) she actively opposed those of her nation's policies that produced the outcome; and (iii) actively opposing the relevant policy was costly for her. I argue that Miller's arguments in favor of this strong externalist view about responsibility and control are insufficient. Specifically, I show that Miller's two models of synchronic collective responsibility—the like-minded group model and the cooperative practice model—ground neither synchronic nor diachronic national responsibility, nor apply in the case of nations generally speaking.
Source: Ethics & Global Politics
Author: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Institution: Aarhus University
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2025480283