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Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing

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Year: 2014
Type: article
Source: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
DOI: 10.1109/tvt.2014.2363842
Authors: Yutian Wen, Jinyu Shi, Qi Zhang, Xiaohua Tian, Zhengyong Huang, Hui Yu, Yu Cheng, Xuemin Shen
Institutions: Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Illinois Institute of Technology, University of Waterloo
Language: English

Topic: Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
Subfield: Computer Science Applications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Keywords: mobile crowdsensing, incentive mechanisms, truthful mechanisms, individual rationality, Wi-Fi fingerprinting, indoor positioning, data reliability, crowdsourcing

Open Access status: closed

Funders: National Science Foundation, National Natural Science Foundation of China
Awards: G5642267641, NeTS: Small: Collaborative Research: Towards Reliable, Energy-Efficient, and Secure Vehicular Networks
OpenAlex ID: W2032596903
FWCI: 15.95
Cites: 26
Cited by: 216
Related to: 10
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