Work

Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity

Year: 2005

Type: article

Abstract: The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter--even if it was with a different partner.

Source: Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences

DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2004.2988

Authors: Thomas Pfeiffer, Claudia Rutte, Timothy Killingback, Michael Taborsky, Sebastian Bonhoeffer

Institutions: University of Bern, ETH Zurich

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2037110518

FWCI: 14.8

Cites: 23

Cited by: 217

Related to: 10