Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: Common protection mechanisms fail to provide end-to-end security; programs with legitimate access to secret information are not prevented from leaking this to the world. Information-flow aware analyses track the flow of information through the program to prevent such leakages, but often ignore information flows through covert channels even though they pose a serious threat. A typical covert channel is to use the timing of certain events to carry information. We present a timing-aware information-flow type system for a low-level language similar to a non-trivial subset of a sequential Java bytecode. The type system is parameterized over the time model of the instructions of the language and over the algorithm enforcing low-observational equivalence, used in the prevention of implicit and timing flows.
Authors: Daniel Hedin, David Sands
Institution: Chalmers University of Technology
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2037851672