Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Year: 2001
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals from the NMES. A robust prediction of adverse-selection models is that riskier types buy more coverage and, on average, end up using more care. We test for unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption. We find no evidence of informational asymmetries.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI: 10.2307/2696362
Authors: James H. Cardon, Igal Hendel
Institution: Brigham Young University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2044293638